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Chapter 1
Log-Sobolev inequality and
convergence to equilibrium for the
Wright-Fisher diffusion
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Motivation
My work on functional inequalities is motivated by recent work on degenerate
diffusions by C. Villani and F. Baudoin (see [23] and [3]). Degenerate diffusions
arise as infinite population limits of the Wright-Fisher models in population genetics.
(see [9]) These describe the prevalence of a mutant allele, in a population of fixed
size, under the effects of genetic drift, mutation, migration and selection. The formal
generator of the infinite population limit acts on functions defined on [0, 1] (the space
1
2of frequencies) and is given by
LWF = x(1− x)∂2x +
[
b0(1− x)− b1x+ sx(1− x)
]
∂x
Processes defined by such operators were studied by Feller in the early 1950s and used
to great effect by Kimura, et al. in the 1960s and 70s to give quantitative answers to
a wide range of questions in population genetics.
1.1.2 Goal
Our goal is to say more about convergence to equilibrium for the following diffu-
sion:
L =
1
2
x(1− x)∂2x +
[
b0(1− x)− b1x
]
∂x (1.1.1)
on [0, 1] and the following two-dimensional extension:
L =
1
2
2∑
i,j=1
(
δijxi − xixj
) ∂2
∂xi∂xj
+
n∑
k=1
bk − xk 3∑
l=1
bl
 ∂
∂xk
. (1.1.2)
for x ∈ {(x1, x2)|x1, x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 ≤ 1}.
In particular we are able to show convergence in entropy which is much stronger than
the L2- convergence that was already established by [21](Proposition 3.3), at least in
the one-dimensional case.
31.1.3 Method
Following [2] we assume µ is a probability measure. We define the entropy of a
positive function f to be
Ent(f) =
∫
(f log f)dµ−
∫
fdµ log
∫
fdµ.
Then the (tight) Log-Sobolev inequality
Ent(f 2) ≤ C
∫
Γ(f, f)dµ
for all f ∈ C2(Rn) implies convergence to equilibrium with rate 4
C
:
Proposition 1.1.1. The tight logarithmic Sobolev inequality holds with a constant C
if and only if, for any integrable positive function f ,
Ent(Ptf) ≤ e−4t/CEnt(f).
We proceed with the development of a so-called Γ-Calculus. This Γ-Calculus will
allow us to prove the Log-Sobolev inequality above.
Γ-Calculus
Consider Rn and diffusion operator L. Let Pt = etL be the heat semigroup gen-
erated by L. Recall that for every f ∈ C∞0 (Rn) , the function u(t, x) = Pt(f)(x) is a
solution to the the heat equation associated to L,
∂tu(t, x) = Lu(t, x) , u(0, x) = f(x).
4The “length of the gradient” of a smooth function f : M → R is given by the carre´
du champ operator for L
Γ(f, f) = Γ(f) :=
1
2
(
Lf 2 − 2fLf) .
We can also define a bilinear form:
Γ2(f, f) = Γ2(f) :=
1
2
(
LΓ(f, f)− 2Γ (f, Lf)) .
We have that (see [2] Theorem 3.2(2))
Proposition 1.1.2. If
Γ2(f, f) ≥ ρΓ(f, f) for all f ∈ C∞c (Rn)
for some ρ > 0 the invariant measure is finite and, for the invariant probability, the
tight logarithmic Sobolev inequality holds with a constant C bounded above by 2
ρ
.
1.2 The one-dimensional Wright-Fisher model
We consider the one-dimensional diffusion operator on [0, 1],
L =
1
2
x(1− x) ∂
2
∂x2
+
(
b0(1− x)− b1x
) ∂
∂x
5where b0, b1 ≥ 0. This diffusion operator corresponds to a stochastic process (Xt)
that is characterized by the following stochastic differential equation:
dXt =
(
b0(1−Xt)− b1Xt
)
dt+
√
Xt(1−Xt)dBt
where (Bt) is a standard Brownian motion.
We can write L in the form
L =
1
m
∂
∂x
(
mσ2
∂
∂x
)
,
where
σ2(x) =
1
2
x(1− x)
and
m(x) = x2b0−1(1− x)2b1−1.
The operator L is symmetric for the measure dµ(x) = m(x)dx. We define
Γ(f) =
1
2
L(f 2)− fLf.
A straightforward computation shows that
Γ(f) =
1
2
x(1− x)
(
∂f
∂x
)2
.
Consider now
Γ2(f) =
1
2
LΓ(f)− Γ(f, Lf).
We compute:
6Lemma 1.2.1.
Γ2(f) =
(
1
2
x(1− x)∂
2f
∂x2
+
1
4
(1− 2x) ∂f
∂x
)2
+
1
4
(
b1x+ b0(1− x)− 1
4
)(
∂f
∂x
)2
Proof. We write the operator L using arbitrary coefficients a(x) and b(x). We have
that
Lf = a(x)fxx + b(x)fx,
Γ(f, g) = a(x)fxgx,
LΓ(f) = aaxx(fx)
2 + 4aaxfxfxx + 2a
2(fxx)
2 + 2a2fxfxxx + bax(fx)
2 + 2abfxfxx,
Γ(f, Lf) = aaxfxfxx + a
2fxfxxx + abx(fx)
2 + abfxfxx,
Γ2(f) =
1
2
LΓ(f)− Γ(f, Lf)
=
(
1
2
aaxx +
1
2
bax − abx
)
(fx)
2 + aaxfxfxx + a
2(fxx)
2
=
(
1
2
aaxx +
1
2
bax − abx − 1
4
a2x
)
(fx)
2 +
(
1
2
axfx + afxx
)2
Denote by ϕ(x) the coefficient of (fx)
2 on the right-hand side of the preceding in-
equality. We have
a(x) =
1
2
x(1− x), ax(x) = 1
2
(1− 2x), axx(x) = −1,
b(x) = b0(1− x)− b1x, bx(x) = −(b0 + b1),
and so we obtain
ϕ(x) =
1
4
(
b1x+ b0(1− x)− 1
4
)
.

7From this we have:
Corollary 1.2.2. Assume b0, b1 ≥ 14 . Then
Γ2(f) ≥ ρΓ(f), (1.2.1)
with
ρ =
1
2
(
b0 + b1 − 1
2
)
+
√(
b0 − 1
4
)(
b1 − 1
4
)
.
Proof.
Γ2(f) =
(
1
2
x(1− x)∂
2f
∂x2
+
1
4
(1− 2x) ∂f
∂x
)2
+
1
4
(
b1x+ b0(1− x)− 1
4
)(
∂f
∂x
)2
≥ 1
4
(
b1x+ b0(1− x)− 1
4
)(
∂f
∂x
)2
≥ ρΓ(f).
with
ρ =
1
2
(
b0 + b1 − 1
2
)
+
√(
b0 − 1
4
)(
b1 − 1
4
)
. 
The main result for the one-dimensional Wright-Fisher diffusion is given by:
Theorem 1.2.3. Let Pt be the semigroup corresponding to the diffusion with infinites-
imal generator given by equation 1.1.1 and assume b0, b1 ≥ 14 . Then for any integrable
positive function f ,
Ent(Ptf) ≤ e−AtEnt(f)
8where A ≥ (b0 + b1 − 12) + 2
√
(b0 − 14)(b1 − 14).
Proof. Combining corollary (1.2.2) with proposition (1.1.2) we obtain a tight Log-
Sobolev inequality with C ≤ 2
ρ
. The theorem follows then from proposition (1.1.1).

Remark 1 The case b0 = b1 = 1/4 is interesting (critical case for which ρ = 0). Itoˆ’s
formula shows that the diffusion process with generator L is
Xt =
1
2
(1 + cosBt)
where B is a Brownian motion.
1.3 The two-dimensional Wright-Fisher diffusion
We now consider the 2-dimensional diffusion operator
L =
1
2
2∑
i,j=1
(
δijxi − xixj
) ∂2
∂xi∂xj
+
2∑
k=1
bk − xk n+1∑
l=1
bl
 ∂
∂xk
.
For all i, j = 1, . . . , 2, we denote for brevity:
aij(x) =
1
2
(δijxi − xixj), and ci(x) = bi − xi
3∑
l=1
bl. (1.3.1)
9Lemma 1.3.1. For all f ∈ C2(R2), we have
Γ2(f) =
1
2
2∑
i,j,k,l=1
aij∂xixjalkfxlfxk +
1
2
2∑
i,j,k=1
ci∂xialkfxlfxk −
2∑
i,j,k=1
aij∂xjckfxifxk
+
2∑
i,j,k,l=1
aij∂xialk
(
fxjxlfxk + fxjxkfxl − fxlxkfxj
)
+
2∑
i,j,k,l=1
aijalkfxlxifxkxj .
(1.3.2)
Proof. Identity (1.3.2) is obtained by direct calculations. We have
Γ(f, g) =
2∑
i,j=1
aijfxigxj , (1.3.3)
which gives us
∂xiΓ(f) =
2∑
l,k=1
(∂xialk)fxlfxk +
2∑
l,k=1
alk
(
fxlxifxk + fxlfxkxi
)
,
∂xixjΓ(f) =
2∑
l,k=1
∂xixjalkfxlfxk +
2∑
l,k=1
∂xialk
(
fxlxjfxk + fxlfxkxj
)
+
2∑
l,k=1
∂xjalk
(
fxlxifxk + fxlfxkxi
)
+
2∑
l,k=1
alk
(
fxlxixjfxk + fxlxifxkxj + fxlxjfxkxi + fxlfxkxixj
)
.
10
Combining the preceding two identities we obtain that
L(Γ(f)) =
2∑
i,j,k,l=1
aij∂xixjalkfxlfxk + 2
2∑
i,j,k,l=1
aij∂xialk
(
fxlxjfxk + fxlfxkxj
)
+ 2
2∑
i,j,l,k=1
aijalk
(
fxlxixjfxk + fxlxifxkxj
)
+
2∑
i,l,k=1
ci∂xialkfxlfxk + 2
2∑
i,l,k=1
cialkfxlxifxk .
(1.3.4)
We also have
∂xjLf =
2∑
l,k=1
∂xjalkfxlxk +
2∑
l,k=1
alkfxlxkxj +
2∑
l=1
∂xjclfxl +
2∑
l,k=1
clfxlxj .
which gives us
Γ(f, Lf) =
2∑
i,j,l,k=1
aij∂xjalkfxlxkfxi +
2∑
i,j,l,k=1
aijalkfxlxkxjfxi
+
2∑
i,jl=1
aij∂xjclfxlfxi +
2∑
l,k=1
aijclfxlxjfxi .
(1.3.5)
Combining (1.3.5) and (1.3.4), we obtain identity (1.3.2). 
In the two dimensional case we can prove the following lower bound for Γ2:
Lemma 1.3.2. If b1, b2, b3 ≥ 0 are such that
b1 + b2 + b3 > 1
and
b1 + b2
b1 + b2 + b3 − 1 <
min1≤i≤2 bi − 3
min1≤i≤2 bi
11
then there is a positive constant ρ such that
Γ2(f) ≥ ρΓ(f). (1.3.6)
The optimal ρ for the inequality above is given by
ρ =
(b3 − 1) min1≤i≤2 bi
12(b1 + b2 + b3 − 1) −
1
4
Proof. Using the form of the coefficients aij(x) and ci(x) (see equation (1.3.1)), we
have
∂xlaij =
1
2
δilδjl − 1
2
δilxj − 1
2
δjlxi,
∂xlxkaij = −
1
2
δilδjk − 1
2
δikδjl,
∂xlci = −δil
3∑
k=1
bk.
and so, we obtain a simplified form of Γ2(f):
Γ2(f) =
2∑
i=1
−1
2
aii +
1
4
ci(1− 2xi) + aii
3∑
k=1
bk
(fxi)2
+
∑
i<j
−aij − 1
2
cixj − 1
2
cjxi + 2aij
3∑
k=1
bk
 (fxifxj)
+
2∑
i,j,k,l=1
aij∂xialk
(
fxjxlfxk + fxjxkfxl − fxlxkfxj
)
+
2∑
i,j,k,l=1
aijalkfxlxifxkxj .
(1.3.7)
12
To obtain the inequality Γ2(f) ≥ ρΓ(f), it is necessary to have that
2∑
i,j,k,l=1
aijalkfxlxifxkxj ≥ 0. (1.3.8)
Consider the (22 × 22)-matrix defined by
Apq = aijalk, ∀ p, q = 1, . . . , 22,
where the indices i, j, k, l are the unique integers in {1, 2, . . . , 2}, chosen such that
p = (l − 1)2 + i and q = (k − 1)2 + j. We also consider the 22-column vector
X(l−1)2+i := fxlxi . Then we can write
2∑
i,j,k,l=1
aijalkfxlxifxkxj = 〈X,AX〉 ,
and so, to prove inequality (1.3.8), we only need to show that the matrix A is non-
negative definite. Writing the vector X = (η1, η2), where ηi ∈ R2, for i = 1, 2, we
have that
〈X,AX〉 =
2∑
i,j=1
aij
〈
ηi, aηj
〉
.
Because a is a symmetric, nonnegative definite matrix, there is an orthogonal matrix,
P , and a diagonal matrix, D, such that a = P TDP . By letting ζi :=
√
DPηi, we
have that
〈
ηi, aηj
〉
=
〈
ζi, ζj
〉
, and so we can find real constants, ξ1, ξ2, such that〈
ζi, ζj
〉
= ξiξj. The preceding three identities together with the fact that a is a
13
nonnegative matrix give us that
〈X,AX〉 =
2∑
i,j=1
aijξiξj ≥ 0.
Thus inequality (1.3.8) holds.
Since the operator L is defined on the unit simplex {x1, x2 ≥ 0 : x1 + x2 ≤ 1} Γ(f)
and Γ2(f) are also defined on this domain. First assume x1,x2 > 0 and x1 + x2 < 1.
Returning to the simplified expression for Γ2(f) as given in equation (1.3.7) we notice
that
2∑
i,j,k,l=1
aij(∂xialk)
(
fxjxlfxk + fxjxkfxl − fxlxkfxj
)
=
2∑
j,k,l=1
fxjxlfxk(ajkl + ajlk − aklj) =
2∑
j,k,l=1
ajklfxjxlfxk
(1.3.9)
where ajkl denotes
∑2
i=1 aij(∂xialk).
Using this notation we write the simplified Γ2(f) as follows:
Γ2(f) = a
2
11f
2
x1x1
+
(
4a11a12fx1x2 + 2a
2
12fx2x2 + a111fx1 + a121fx2
)
fx1x1 (1.3.10)
+(2a11a22 + 2a
2
12)f
2
x1x2
+ 4a12a22fx1x2fx2x2 + a
2
22f
2
x2x2
+
2∑
j,k,l=1,(j,l)6=(1,1)
ajklfxjxlfxk
+S1(a11(x), c1(x), x1)f
2
x1
+S2(a22(x), c2(x), x2)f
2
x2
+S12(a12(x), c1(x), c2(x), x1, x2)fx1fx2
Completing the square with respect to fx1x1 ,fx1x2 and fx2x2 we get the previous ex-
14
pression (equation (1.3.10)) is equal to
(
...
)2
+
(
...
)2
+
(
...
)2
−
(
− 1
4
x1fx1 +
1
2
x1x2 − 12x1 − x2 + 12
2(1− x1) fx2
)2
(1.3.11)
−
(
− 1
2
(x1 − 1
2
)fx1 +
1
2
x2(x1 − 12)
(1− x1) fx2
)2
− x1x2(1− x1 − x2)
8(1− x1)2 f
2
x2
+S1(a11(x), c1(x), x1)f
2
x1
+S2(a22(x), c2(x), x2)f
2
x2
+S12(a12(x), c1(x), c2(x), x1, x2)fx1fx2
≥
(
...
)2
+
(
...
)2
+
(
...
)2
−
(
− 1
4
x1fx1 +
1
2
x1x2 − 12x1 − x2 + 12
2(1− x1) fx2
)2
(1.3.12)
−
(
− 1
2
(x1 − 1
2
)fx1 +
1
2
x2(x1 − 12)
(1− x1) fx2
)2
− 1
8
1
2
‖Df‖2
+S1(a11(x), c1(x), x1)f
2
x1
+S2(a22(x), c2(x), x2)f
2
x2
+S12(a12(x), c1(x), c2(x), x1, x2)fx1fx2
Now observe that equation (1.3.12) is of the form
(
...
)2
+
(
...
)2
+
(
...
)2
−
(
β1(x)fx1 + β2(x)fx2
)2
−
(
γ1(x)fx1 + γ2(x)fx2
)2
− 1
16
‖Df‖2+S1(a11(x), c1(x), x1)f 2x1+S2(a22(x), c2(x), x2)f 2x2+S12(a12(x), c1(x), c2(x), x1, x2)fx1fx2
with
β1(x) = −1
4
x1
β2(x) =
1
2
x1x2 − 12x1 − x2 + 12
2(1− x1)
γ1(x) = −1
2
(x1 − 1
2
)
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γ2(x) =
1
2
x2(x1 − 12)
(1− x1)
Notice that the functions β1, β2, γ1, γ2 are all bounded by the constant
1
4
. Conse-
quently we have
Γ2(f) ≥ −3 1
16
‖Df‖2 − 3 1
16
‖Df‖2 − 1
16
‖Df‖2
+S1(a11(x), c1(x), x1)f
2
x1
+S2(a22(x), c2(x), x2)f
2
x2
+S12(a12(x), c1(x), c2(x), x1, x2)fx1fx2
= − 7
16
‖Df‖2
+
(
− 1
2
a11 +
1
4
c1(1− 2x1) + a11
3∑
k=1
bk
)
f 2x1 +
(
− 1
2
a22 +
1
4
c2(1− 2x2) + a22
3∑
k=1
bk
)
f 2x2
+
(
− a12 − 1
2
c1x2 − 1
2
c2x1 + 2a12
3∑
k=1
bk
)
fx1fx2
Using the expression of the coefficients aij(x) and ci(x), direct calculations give us
− 1
2
aii(x) +
1
4
ci(x)(1− 2xi) + aii(x)
3∑
k=1
bk
=
1
4
x2i +
1
4
 3∑
k=1
bk − 1
xi + 1
4
bi(1− 2xi),
− aij(x)− 1
2
ci(x)xj − 1
2
cj(x)xi + 2aij(x)
3∑
k=1
bk
=
1
2
xixj − bi
2
xj − bj
2
xi.
For all  > 0 and ξ ∈ R2, we use the inequalities
−bi
2
xjξiξj ≥ −ε
4
bixjξ
2
i −
1
4ε
bixjξ
2
j ,
16
−bj
2
xiξiξj ≥ − 1
4ε
bjxiξ
2
i −
ε
4
bjxiξ
2
j ,
and we obtain that
2∑
i=1
−1
2
aii(x) +
1
4
ci(x)(1− 2xi) + aii(x)
3∑
k=1
bk
 f 2xi
+
∑
i<j
−aij − 1
2
cixj − 1
2
cjxi + 2aij
3∑
k=1
bk
 fxifxj
≥ 1
4
 2∑
i=1
xifxi
2
+
2∑
i=1
14
b3 − 1 + (1− 1ε
) 2∑
j=1
j 6=i
bj − (1− ε)bi
xi + 14bi
1− ε 2∑
j=1
xj

 f 2xi .
Since
∑2
j=1 xj ≤ 1, we have that
1
4
bi
1− ε 2∑
j=1
xj
 ≥ 1
4
bi(1− ε), ∀ ε ∈ (0, 1).
By assumption we have
b1 + b2
b1 + b2 + b3 − 1 <
min1≤i≤2 bi − 3
min1≤i≤2 bi
.
Pick ε such that
b1 + b2
b1 + b2 + b3 − 1 < ε <
min1≤i≤2 bi − 3
min1≤i≤2 bi
.
ε >
b1 + b2
b1 + b2 + b3 − 1
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implies
b3 − 1 +
(
1− 1
ε
)
b1 − (1− ε)b2 > b3 − 1 +
(
1− 1
ε
)
(b1 + b2) > 0
and
b3 − 1 +
(
1− 1
ε
)
b2 − (1− ε)b1 > b3 − 1 +
(
1− 1
ε
)
(b1 + b2) > 0
Therefore we can write
Γ2(f) ≥ −3
4
‖Df‖2 + 1
4
2∑
i=1
bi (1− ε) f 2xi ≥ −
3
4
‖Df‖2 + 1
4
(1− ε) min
1≤i≤2
bi ‖Df‖2 .
Now ε <
min1≤i≤2 bi−3
min1≤i≤2 bi
implies
δ = −3
4
+
1
4
(1− ε) min
1≤i≤2
bi > 0.
Therefore we may conclude as follows:
There exists a ρ > 0 such that
Γ2(f) ≥ δ ‖Df‖2 ≥ δ
3
Γ(f) = ρΓ(f).
To be precise this ρ is given by
ρ = −1
4
+
1
(2n− 1)4 (1− ε) min1≤i≤n bi = −
1
4
+
1
12
(1− ε) min
1≤i≤2
bi.
The optimal ρ (make optimal choice ) is given by
ρ =
(b3 − 1) min1≤i≤2 bi
12(b1 + b2 + b3 − 1) −
1
4
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For the points on the boundary of the domain we also have the desired lower bound
for Γ2. 
With the help of the lemma above we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1.3.3. Let Pt be the semigroup corresponding to the diffusion with infinites-
imal generator given by equation 1.1.2. Assume b1 + b2 + b3 > 1 and
b1+b2
b1+b2+b3−1 <
min1≤i≤2 bi−3
min1≤i≤2 bi
. Then for any integrable positive function f ,
Ent(Ptf) ≤ e−AtEnt(f)
where A ≥ (b3−1) min1≤i≤2 bi
6(b1+b2+b3−1) − 12 .
Proof. Combining lemma (1.3.2) with proposition (1.1.2) we obtain a tight Log-
Sobolev inequality with C ≤ 2
ρ
. The theorem follows then from proposition (1.1.1).

Chapter 2
Introduction to the value of weak
information in incomplete markets
2.1 Set-up
Following [4] and [5] we start with a constant finite time horizon T > 0 and a
filtered probability space
(
Ω, (Ft)0≤t≤T , P˜
)
which satisfies the usual conditions.(F0
is trivial) Assume the price process of a given contingent claim is a continuous
d−dimensional and F -adapted square integrable local martingale (St)0≤t≤T with quadratic
covariation matrix denoted by 〈S〉:
〈S〉t =
(〈
Si, Sj
〉
t
)
1≤i,j≤d
We assume 〈S〉 is almost surely valued in the space of positive matrices so that S is
non-degenerate. Since we assumed S to be a local martingale under P˜, the market
just defined has no arbitrage. The no arbitrage condition is discussed in more depth
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in later in this chapter. In the context described above there is only one measure
P˜ that guarantees S is a local martingale. This situation corresponds to a complete
market. More generally we can consider a set of measures M for which S is a local
martingale. This means the market is incomplete.
2.2 Weak information
Let Y : Ω −→ Rd be a FT -measurable random variable. Let PY denote the law
of Y . We consider an insider who is (only) weakly informed on the random variable
Y . This means that they have knowledge of the filtration F and of the law of Y . We
proceed by associating a probability measure ν on Rd to the random variable Y . It
is required that ν is equivalent to the law of Y PY with a bounded density. One can
interpret the measure ν as the law of Y under the effective probability of the market.
Now consider the following probability measure associated with the weak information
(Y, ν).
Definition. Define the probability measure Pν defined on (Ω,FT ) by:
Pν(A) =
∫
Rd
P˜(A|Y ∈ dy)ν(dy), A ∈ FT
where P˜ ∈ M is one of the risk-neutral probabilities in the (incomplete) market. Pν
is called the minimal probability associated with the weak information (Y, ν). Pν is
minimal in the sense of the proposition below. Let φ : R+ −→ R be a given convex
function. Denote by Eν the set of probability measures Q on Ω which are equivalent
to P and such that the law of Y under Q is ν. Then
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Proposition 2.2.1.
min
Q∈Eν
E
[
φ
(dQ
dP
)]
= E
[
φ
(dPν
dP
)]
.
Remark. Proposition 2.2.1. (over the class of functions φ) says that Pν dominates
every other measure in Eν in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance:
Pν ≥2 Q
for every Q ∈ Eν .
We are interested in the financial value of the weak information as described above.
We need the following definitions and notations.
Consider an economic agent whose preferences over terminal consumption bundles
are represented by a utility function U : (0,∞) → R. The function U is assumed to
be strictly concave, strictly increasing and continuously differentiable and to satisfy
the Inada conditions:
U ′(0) := lim
x→0
U ′(x) =∞, U ′(∞) := lim
x→∞
U ′(x) = 0. (2.2.1)
Let AF(S) be the set of adapted admissible strategies.
Definition The space AF(S) of admissible strategies is the space of Rd-valued and
F -predictable processes Θ integrable with respect to the price process S, such that
(∫ t
0
Θu · dSu
)
0≤t≤T
is a (P˜,F)-martingale for all P˜ ∈M(S).
Remark. Θit represents the number of shares of the risky asset Si held by an investor
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at time t and the wealth process associated with the strategy Θ ∈ AF(S) with initial
capital x is given by
Vt = x+
∫ t
0
Θu · dSu.
In particular, our strategies are self-financing.
Definition We define the financial value of the weak information (Y, ν) as being
u(x, ν) := inf
Q∈Eν
sup
Θ∈AF (S)
EQ
(
U
(
x+
∫ T
0
ΘudSu
))
where x > 0 denotes the initial wealth of the investor.
2.3 Weak information and (the absence of) arbi-
trage opportunities
Since S is a local martingale under P˜, the market defined in the previous subsec-
tions has no arbitrage. What we mean with no arbitrage here is there are no arbitrage
opportunities with tame portfolios as discussed in (Leventhal and Skorohod, 1995),
Corollary 2. A tame portfolio is defined as follows:
Definition (Tame portfolio) A portfolio Θ is called a tame portfolio if there exists
C > −∞ such that P (Xt > C ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ 1) = 1.
Here (Xt) is the so-called discounted capital gain process (see Definition 2 in (Leven-
thal and Skorohod, 1995)) associated with the portfolio Θ. Restricting our attention
to tame portfolios can be interpreted as putting a limit on borrowing.
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Consider the following financial market:
(
Ω, (Ht)0≤t≤T , (St)0≤t≤T ,Q
)
where H is a filtration (right-continuous and P-complete) which contains the natural
filtration of S, and Q a probability measure equivalent to P.
Following [7] we give the following definition concerning arbitrage opportunities.
Definition (No Arbitrage) We say there is no arbitrage on the financial market
(
Ω, (Ht)0≤t≤T , (St)0≤t≤T ,Q
)
,
if there exists a probability measure Q˜ equivalent to Q such that (St)0≤t≤T is an H-
adapted local martingale under Q˜.
Notice that by Corollary 1.2 in [7] this is equivalent to NFLVR. (see [7], [8])
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As it turns out there are no arbitrage opportunities in a financial market that has
the weak information.
Let Eν be the space of measures Q on (Ω,F) such that
1.Q ∼ P
2.Q(Y ∈ dy) = ν(dy)
Observe that the financial market associated with a measure Q ∈ Eν
(
Ω, (Ft)0≤t≤T , (St)0≤t≤T ,Q
)
,
is free from arbitrage since there exists a measure P ∼ Q such that (St)0≤t≤T is an
F -adapted local martingale under P which is equivalent to NFLVR.
Definition.(Space of local martingale measures) The space M(S) of martingale
measures is the set of probability measures P˜ ∼ P such that (St)0≤t≤T is an F -adapted
local martingale under P˜. Clearly if
M(S) 6= ∅ (2.3.1)
there are no arbitrage opportunities.Now consider the set of cadlag densities of ELMM’s
Definition
Z =
{(dP˜t
dPt
)
0≤t≤T
: P˜ ∈M(S)
}
Here P denotes the so-called historical measure of the price process S not the proba-
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bility measure P introduced above.The condition
Z 6= ∅ (2.3.2)
is equivalent to condition (2.3.1). [15] introduced a weaker no arbitrage formulation
where the set Z is enlarged in the following way:
Z := {Z ≥ 0 : Z0 = 1, (XZ)0≤t≤T is a supermartingale for every X ∈ X (1)}.
whose elements are supermartingales as 1 ∈ X (1).
2.4 Review of results on the value of weak infor-
mation
As it turns out the in a complete market the financial value of weak information
is given by the following expression:
Theorem 2.4.1. Assume that integrals below are convergent. Then for each initial
investment x > 0,
u(x, ν) = sup
Θ∈AF (S)
Eν
(
U
(
x+
∫ T
0
ΘudSu
))
=
∫
Rd
U
(
I
(Λ(x)
ξ(y)
))
ν(dy)
where Λ(x) is defined by ∫
Rd
I
(Λ(x)
ξ(y)
)
PY (dy) = x.
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For a more detailed version of this theorem and details on notation see [4]. By
convex duality this theorem is a consequence of proposition 2.2.1. The proof uses
classical results on the martingale dual approach in a complete market. (see [13]
and [14])For the log and power utility we obtain the following formula’s for the value
of weak information:
Example(Log utility) Let U(x) = ln(x). Then
u(x, ν) = ln(x) +
∫
P
dν
dP˜Y
(y) ln
( dν
dP˜Y
)
P˜(Y ∈ dy).
Example(Power utility) Let α ∈ (0, 1) and U(x) = xα
α
. Then
u(x, ν) =
xα
α
[∫
P
( dν
dP˜Y
(y)
) 1
1−α P˜(Y ∈ dy)
]1−α
.
[4] also has a version of this theorem for incomplete markets (Theorem 20, p.
77). To prove this theorem using classical duality methods we need the additional
assumption of asymptotic elasticity of the utility function U :
lim sup
x→∞
xU ′(x)
U(x)
< 1.
See [16] for details on this assumption.
Theorem 2.4.2. For each initial investment x > 0,
u(x, ν) = inf
y>0
((
inf
pi∈D
∫
P
U˜(ypi(u))ν(du)
)
+ xy
)
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where
D = {dP˜Y
dν
, P˜ ∈M(S)}.
Chapter 3
The financial value of weak
information in discrete market
models
3.1 Introduction
Suppose an investor is interested in maximizing her or his expected utility from the
value of a portfolio at a future time. Assume the investor possesses some information
in particular she or he knows the distribution of the prices of stocks in the market at
this future time. Because the information concerns the distribution of stock prices it
is referred to as weak information. The main question of this chapter is:“: What is
the financial value of this information ?
Notice that we will be looking at expected utility, not expected wealth. This is in
line with classical results and allows us to take an individual’s attitude towards risk
into account. In the previous chapter we discussed some results on utility optimization
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and the financial value of weak information in a continuous time. The purpose of the
current chapter is to describe some of the results recently obtained in a discrete time
setting by the author and others in [1]. It should be stressed that the discrete time
results cannot be obtained as a consequence of the continuous time results.
In this chapter we assume a complete market with no transaction costs. The
incomplete market case is discussed in chapter 5. For an introduction to complete
markets we refer the reader to [6]. The main tool for finding the optimal expected
utility in the presence of weak information is the martingale method. (see [22]) The
problem we discuss is related to robust utility maximization problems. (see [10] and
later works by H. Fo¨llmer, A. Gundel and S. Weber)
3.2 Utility Functions
Since we are interested in optimizing expected utility, it is crucial to introduce the
notion of a utility function and discuss some assumptions we are making about utility
functions. We will denote our utility function by U . A utility function measures an
individual’s happiness or satisfaction with a certain level of wealth as opposed to
using the level of wealth itself as a measure of happiness. This allow us to take an
individual’s risk aversion into account. Risk aversion of a utility function can be
measured in terms of the absolute or relative risk aversion coefficient. (see [17]) We
assume that a utility function is strictly concave, strictly increasing and continuously
differentiable. In addition we assume that (as in [4])
lim
x→0
U ′(x) = +∞ and lim
x→∞
U ′(x) = 0. (3.2.1)
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These conditions guarantee the utility function U exhibits risk aversion, satisfies the
law of diminishing marginal utility and an increase in wealth causing an increase in
utility. We are interested in three specific types of utility functions:
1. Log Utility: U(x) = ln(x), x > 0
The relative risk aversion coefficient of this utility function is equal to 1. Under
certain conditions this might be interpreted as the proportion of risky assets
held in a portfolion being independent of the individuals wealth x.
2. Power Utility: U(x) = x
γ
γ
, for −∞ < γ < 0 and 0 < γ < 1 and x > 0
Here the relative risk aversion coefficient is also constant but equal to 1− γ. In
particular, γ being between 0 and 1 corresponds to a less risk averse individual
compared to an individual having a logarithmic utility function whereas the
parameter γ < 0 corresponds to an individual being more risk averse than an
individual having a log utility function. If γ goes to −∞ the individual becomes
more and more risk-averse.
3. Exponential Utility: U(x) = −e−αx, for α > 0 and x ∈ R
The absolute risk aversion coefficient for the utility function given above is
equal to α. This corresponds to an individual taking a constant amount of risk
(independent of their wealth) as opposed to a constant proportion of risk. The
exponential utility function does not satisfy the condition (3.2.1) but is men-
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tioned here because the results described in this section also hold true for this
utility function.
3.3 Modelling the Financial Value of Weak Infor-
mation
3.3.1 Setup
Assume we are in a market with d securities. Without loss of generality one of
these securities is assumed to be a risk-free asset with (fixed) rate of return r. Let
Ω1 = {ω1, .., ωM} be the sample space of possible outcomes of security prices after
one time period. Assume we have a finite number of time periods with N denoting
the final time period. The vector of security prices at time n ∈ {0, 1, .., N} is denoted
by ~Sn ∈ Rd. Consider a probability measure P. Without loss of generality we may
assume P(ωj) > 0,∀j ∈ {1, ..,M}, since if P(ωj) = 0 we simply exclude ωj from
Ω1. We will assume our market is free from arbitrage and complete. To make this
more specific we need to introduce a set of equivalent martingale measures M. The
elements of this set are denoted by P˜. In the current discrete context ’equivalent’
means P˜(ωj) > 0 for all ωj. A probability measure is a martingale measure if and
only if discounted stock prices are martingales under P˜. As it turns out the no
arbitrage assumption is equivalent to assuming M is nonempty. Additionally, in a
complete market (with no arbitrage) the setM is a singleton,M = {P˜}. More details
about no arbitrage, completeness and equivalent martingale methods may be found
in [22]. The probability P˜ may be interpreted as a representation of the knowledge of
an uninformed investor. Using Jensen’s inequality it may be seen that this is same as
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having no information at all because it is optimal to invest everything in the risk-free
security. The value of an investment portfolio consisting of different quantities of the
d securities in the market at time n is denoted by Vn. The initial value of portfolio
or initial wealth of the investor V0 is denoted by v. When comparing investment
strategies we consider the set of all self-financing portfolios Ψv.
3.3.2 Weak Anticipation
Let Ω denote the path space of the (M-dimensional) security price process { ~Sn}1≤n≤N
and let A denote the set of possible values of ~SN . Note that since the sample space
at every time step Ω1 is finite A is a finite set as well. Now suppose an investor has
some weak information (weak anticipation) about the security prices at the final time
N . In particular she or he knows the distribution of ~SN , denoted by ν. In the setting
of the previous chapter we choose Y = ~SN . Similarly to the continuous case, given
the probability measure ν we define a probability measure Pν that is minimal in some
sense.
Definition : The probability measure Pν defined by
Pν(ω) :=
∑
~x∈A
P˜(ω| ~SN = ~x)ν( ~SN = ~x)
is called the minimal probability measure associated with the weak information ν,
where P˜ ∈ M is an (remember M is a singleton in a complete market) equivalent
martingale measure.
As it turns out Pν is minimal in the set of probability measures Q equivalent to P
such that Q( ~SN = ~x) = ν( ~SN = ~x) for all ~x ∈ A. We denote this set by Eν .
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Proposition 3.3.1. Let φ be a convex function. Then
min
Q∈Eν
E˜
[
φ
(
dQ
dP˜
)]
= E˜
[
φ
(
dPν
dP˜
)]
,
where dQ
dP˜ denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Q with respect to P˜.
Proof. Let ~x ∈ A and Q ∈ Eν be given. Then,
E˜
[
dQ
dP˜
|~SN = ~x
]
=
ν(~SN = ~x)
P˜(~SN = ~x)
.
Let φ be a convex function. Then, from conditional Jensen’s inequality,
φ
(
ν(~SN = ~x)
P˜(~SN = ~x)
)
= φ
(
E˜
[
dQ
dP˜
|~SN = ~x
])
≤ E˜
[
φ
(
dQ
dP˜
)
|~SN = ~x
]
.
Taking the expected value on both sides, we get
E˜
φ(ν(SN)
P˜(SN)
) = E˜[φ(dPν
dP˜
)]
≤ E˜
[
φ
(
dQ
dP˜
)]
and the result is proved. 
3.3.3 The Financial Value of Weak Information
Notice that an investor who knows the distribution of stock prices at the final
time is given by ν will follow a different strategy than the uninformed investor and
consequently their expected utility from the terminal value of the portfolio will be
different. Therefore it is natural to define the financial value of the weak information ν
as the lowest expected utility that can be gained from possessing the weak information
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ν.
Definition : The financial value of the weak information ν to be gained from
investing v at time zero is given by
u(v, ν) = min
Q∈Eν
max
ψ∈Ψv
EQ[U(VN)].
Denote I(x) = (U ′)−1(x). The following theorem characterizes the value of weak
information and the corresponding optimal investment strategy in the current context.
It is the main theorem in [1].
Theorem 3.3.2. The financial value of weak information in a complete market is
u(v, ν) = max
ψ∈Ψv
Eν [U(VN)] = Eν
U
I ( λ(v)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)
 ,
where λ(v) is uniquely determined by
E˜
 1
(1 + r)N
I
(
λ(v)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
) = v,
where P˜ ∈ M is the unique probability measure under which the prices are martin-
gales. Moreover, the optimal wealth at time n Vˆn is given by
Vˆn =
1
(1 + r)N−n
∑
ω∈Ω
I
(
λ(v)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
(ω)
)
P˜(ω|~Sn), for n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}.
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At time n, the optimal amount to purchase of the ith linearly independent asset is
δin =
M∑
j=1
(D−1n+1)i,jVˆn+1(ωj), for n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1},
where
Dn+1 =

S1n+1(ω1) S
2
n+1(ω1) . . . S
M
n+1(ω1)
S1n+1(ω2) S
2
n+1(ω2) . . . S
M
n+1(ω2)
. . .
. . .
. . .
S1n+1(ωM) S
2
n+1(ωM) . . . S
M
n+1(ωM)

,
is the matrix of M linearly independent asset prices at time n+1, (D−1n+1)i,j represents
the element (i, j) of the matrix D−1n+1, and Vˆn+1 comes from the above equation.
Proof. We will proceed by rewriting max
ψ∈Ψv
EQ[U(VN)]. In order to do this, we need
the convex conjugate U˜(y) := max
x>0
[U(x)− xy].(see [12]) We form the Lagrangian for
solving max
ψ∈Ψv
EQ[U(VN)] by
L(λ) = EQ[U(VN)] + λ
v − EQ [ dP˜
dQ
VN
(1 + r)N
] .
Now using U˜ , substituting in for VN from the martingale method (see appendix), and
doing algebra, we can rewrite our Lagrangian as
L(λ) = λv + E˜
dQ
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
) .
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Thus, we deduce
u(v, ν) = min
Q∈Eν
min
λ>0
λv + E˜
dQ
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)

= min
λ>0
λv + min
Q∈Eν
E˜
dQ
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)
 .
Since the convexity of U˜ implies the function mapping z 7→ zU˜
(
λ
(1+r)Nz
)
is convex,
we can use Proposition 3.3.1 to get
u(v, ν) = min
λ>0
λv + E˜
dPν
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)
 .
Taking the derivative now with respect to λ and setting it equal to 0, we find
v = E˜
 1
(1 + r)N
I
(
λ∗(v)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)
where λ∗(v) is the minimizer. Now,
u(v, ν) = λ∗(v)v + E˜
dPν
dP˜
U˜
(
λ∗(v)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
) = Eν
U
I ( λ∗(v)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)
 .
Thus, we have shown the first part of the theorem. Now note that discounted optimal
wealth process { Vˆn
(1+r)n
}0≤n≤N is a martingale under P˜. (see appendix) As a result,
Vˆn =
1
(1 + r)N−n
E˜[VˆN |~Sn] = 1
(1 + r)N−n
∑
ω∈Ω
I
(
λ(v)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
(ω)
)
P˜(ω|~Sn)
37
for all n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}. Further, note that wealth is determined by your portfolio
from the previous time period and the current prices. Thus,
Vˆn+1 = Dn+1~δn,
so we have
D−1n+1Vˆn+1 = ~δn.

Remark. We know from [6] that the matrix of all asset prices in the complete market
has rank M . Therefore, we can choose M linearly independent assets to invest in.
Further, note that the optimal amount to purchase for each asset is only unique when
M = d.
Definition : We define the additional value of weak information as the extra
utility gained from investing with anticipation instead of just putting all of your
wealth in the risk-free asset, which we define by
F (v, ν) = u(v, ν)− U(v(1 + r)N).
Definition : We also define the ratio of added value to the total value by
pi(v, ν) =
F (v, ν)
u(v, ν)
= 1− U(v(1 + r)
N)
u(v, ν)
Appplying Theorem 3.3.2 to a logarithmic utility function results in an expression for
the additional value of weak information that is interesting in its own right.
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Corollary 3.3.3. The additional value of weak information for the log utility function
is given by the relative entropy of ν with respect to P˜~SN :
F (v, ν) = Eν
ln( dν
dP˜~SN
) .
Proof. We first solve for λ.
v = E˜
 1
(1 + r)N
· I
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)
v = E˜
[
1
(1 + r)N
· (1 + r)
N
λ
· dP
ν
dP˜
]
λ =
1
v
.
Substituting for λ into our value of weak information equation we thus have,
u(v, ν) = Eν
U
I ( λ
(1 + r)N
· dP˜
dPν
)

= Eν
ln((1 + r)N1
v
· dP
ν
dP˜
)
= ln
(
v(1 + r)N
)
+ Eν
[
ln
(
dPν
dP˜
)]
This implies the additional value of weak information for log utility is
F (v, ν) = Eν
[
ln
(
dPν
dP˜
)]
= Eν
ln( dν
dP˜~SN
)
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where the last equality follows from the definition of Pν . 
For the power utility function we obtain the following expression:
Corollary 3.3.4. The value of weak information for the power utility function is
given by
u(v, ν) =
vγ(1 + r)Nγ
γ
E˜[( dP˜
dPν
) 1
γ−1
]γ−1
· Eν
( dP˜
dPν
) γ
γ−1
 .
Proof. We now will solve for the value of λ.
E˜
 1
(1 + r)N
·
(
λ
(1 + r)N
· dP˜
dPν
) 1
γ−1
 = v
λ =

v(1 + r)
Nγ
γ−1
E˜
[(
dP˜
dPν
) 1
γ−1
]

γ−1
.
Substituting in for λ we get,
u(v, ν) = Eν
U
I ( λ
(1 + r)N
· dP˜
dPν
)

= Eν

1
γ


v(1 + r)
Nγ
γ−1
E˜
[(
dP˜
dPν
) 1
γ−1
]

γ−1
· 1
(1 + r)N
· dP˜
dPν

γ
γ−1

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=
vγ(1 + r)Nγ
γ
E˜[( dP˜
dPν
) 1
γ−1
]γ−1
· Eν
( dP˜
dPν
) γ
γ−1
 .

3.4 Complete Markets: The Binomial Model
3.4.1 Single-Period Binomial Model
In this section we look at the most basic example of a complete market in discrete
time: a one-period binomial model. There are two assets in the market, a risk-free
asset with payoff 1 + r and a risky asset with two possible payoffs, S0(1 + h) and
S0(1− k). (stock goes up by h% or goes down by k%) We assume S0 > 0 and k < 1.
This two-asset market is free from arbitrage if and only if h > r > −k. We assume
the market is indeed free from arbitrage. Our portfolio is completely characterized by
how many units of the risky asset we own at time n, which is denoted by δn, because
the portion of our portfolio that is not invested in the risky asset has to be invested
in the (unique) risk-free asset.
Figure 3.4.1 graphs the optimal portfolio at time zero δ0 given the investor knows
there is a 50% chance of the stock going up and a 50% chance of the stock going
down and given the investor’s preferences can be described by the logarithmic utility
function. Of course the value of δ0 depends on the choices of parameter values r, h, k, v
and S0 (also denoted by s).
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ν0 = 50%
δ0 = 12.21095
ν1 = 50%
n = 0 n = 1
Figure 3.4.1 An example of a single-period binomial model using the
log utility where where the parameter values are
r = .032, h = .09, k = .019, v = 200.0, and s = 20.0
For the one-period binomial model a simple expression exists for any choice of the
parameters r, h, k, v, s and for any weak information vector ν =
ν0
ν1
 [1] gives the
following expressions for the optimal δ0 assuming a log, power or exponential utility
function.
Example 1 Log Utility
When looking at the specific utility functions, in the case of log, we begin by maxi-
mizing E[U(VN)] with respect to δ. We then are able to obtain our equation for the
optimal number of shares with respect to wealth, δˆ, in a one period model.
δˆ0 =
v(1 + r)(ν0(h− r) + ν1(−k − r))
−s(h− r)(−k − r) .
Example 2 Power Utility
As in log utility we would solve for our optimal number of shares with respect to
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wealth, δˆ0, in a one period model.
δˆ0 =
((ν0(h− r))
1
γ−1 − (ν1(−k − r))
1
γ−1 )(1 + r)v
(ν1(−k − r))
1
γ−1 s(−k − r)− (ν0(h− r))
1
γ−1 s(h− r)
.
Example 3 Exponential Utility
Similarly to the previously examined utilities we will solve for the optimal number of
shares with respect to wealth, δˆ, in a one period model for the exponential utility.
δˆ0 =
ln (ν0(h− r))− ln (−ν1(−k − r))
s(h+ k)
.
3.4.2 N-Period Binomial Model
Just as for one-period models, for N-period models all the calculations can be
done explicitly. The proposition below gives an explicit formula for the transition
probabilities of the minimal probability Pν . It can be derived using basic probability.
The proposition shows {Sn}1≤n≤N is a Markov chain under the measure Pν .
Proposition 3.4.1. Let l ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} and i ∈ {0, ..., N − l}. Then
Pν(SN−l+1 = (1 + h)SN−l|SN−l = (1 + hN−l−i)(1− k)iS0)
=
l−1∑
j=0
(
l−1
j
)
(N − i− j) . . . (N − i− (l − 1))(i+ 1)(i+ 2) . . . (i+ j)νi+j
l∑
j=0
(
l
j
)
(N − i− j) . . . (N − i− (l − 1))(i+ 1)(i+ 2) . . . (i+ j)νi+j
and
Pν(SN−l+1 = (1− k)SN−l|SN−l = (1 + hN−l−i)(1− k)iS0)
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=
l−1∑
j=0
(
l−1
j
)
(N − i− j − 1) . . . (N − i− (l − 1))(i+ 1) . . . (i+ j + 1)νi+j+1
l∑
j=0
(
l
j
)
(N − i− j) . . . (N − i− (l − 1))(i+ 1)(i+ 2) . . . (i+ j)νi+j
.
Figure 3.4.2 Pν for a 3-period binomial model
n = 0 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
i = 0
•
• i = 1
• •
• i = 2
•
i = 3
3ν0+
2ν1+
ν2
3ν0+
3ν1+
3ν2+
3ν3
ν1+2ν2+3ν3
3ν0+3ν1+3ν2+3ν3
3ν0+
ν1
3ν0+
2ν1+
ν2
ν1+ν23ν0+2ν1+ν2
ν1+
ν2
ν1+
2ν2+
3ν3
ν2+3ν3ν1+2ν2+3ν3
3ν0
3ν0+
ν1
ν13ν0+ν1
ν1
ν1+
ν2
ν2
ν1+ν2
ν2
ν2+
3ν3
3ν3ν2+3ν3
Figure 3.4.3 Pν for a 3-period binomial model for a specific choice of ν
n=0 n=1 n=2 n=3
ν0 = 1/4
·
· ν1 = 1/2
· ·
· ν2 = 1/8
·
ν3 = 1/8
15/24
9/24
2/3
1/3
5/9
4/9
3/5
2/5
4/5
1/5
1/4
3/4
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Example 1 (Log Utility)
S3 = 25.90058
S2 = 23.762
S1 = 21 S3 = 23.31052
S0 = 20 S2 = 21.3858
S1 = 19.62 S3 = 20.97947
S3 = 19.24722
S3 = 18.88152
n = 0 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
Figure 3.4.4 A 3-period binomial tree showing the values of Sn where
the parameters are r = .032, h = .09, k = .019, v = 200.0, and s = 20.0
ν0 = 25%
δ2 = 146.4281
δ1 = 76.48093 ν1 = 25%
δ0 = 12.21095 δ2 = 8.141736
δ1 = −50.58155 ν2 = 25%
δ2 = −107.9549
ν3 = 25%
n = 0 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
ν = 20%
δ2 = 251.9051
δ1 = 192.0971 ν = 40%
δ0 = 96.13333 δ2 = 112.1887
δ1 = −32.0822 ν = 30%
δ2 = −224.84
ν = 10%
n = 0 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
Figure 3.4.5 3-period binomial trees showing the values of δ for various
anticipations of ν using the log utility where the parameters are
r = .032, h = .09, k = .019, v = 200.0, and s = 20.0
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From figure 3.4.5 it can be seen how the optimal investment strategy changes
depending on different values of the weak information ν in a 3-period model. Because
in the second tree the chances of the stock going to the upper nodes are larger than
the chances of going to the lower outcome nodes the optimal strategy has larger
δ− values, which means more investment in the risky asset. Negative values of δ
correspond to short-selling the asset. Recall from Corollary 3.3.3 the additional value
of weak information for log utility is
F (v, ν) = Eν
[
ln
(
dPν
dP˜
)]
,
and the proportion is
pi(v, ν) =
Eν
[
ln
(
dPν
dP˜
)]
ln
(
v(1 + r)N
)
+ Eν
[
ln
(
dPν
dP˜
)] .
Note that F (v, ν) is only a function of ν, so for any fixed ν, we have that F (v, ν)
is constant. Furthermore, pi(v, ν) is a decreasing function of v for any fixed ν. This
implies that as the initial wealth of the investor v increases a smaller proportion of
utility is gained from possessing weak information. We include some graphs of a
5-period binomial model for the quantities we just discussed assuming the following
distributions for the stock prices at the final time:
• Precise: {0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.95, 0.01, 0.01}
• Uniform Distribution: {1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6}
• Conservative: {0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1}
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• Risk-Neutral: ν = P˜
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Risk−Neutral
Figure 3.4.6 Value of Weak Info. given r = 3%, h = 8%, k = 4%
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
Initial Wealth
F(
v)
Precise
Uniform Dist.
Conservative
Risk−Neutral
Figure 3.4.7 Additional Value of Weak Info. given r = 3%, h = 8%,
k = 4%
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Figure 3.4.8 Proportion of Value Added r = 3%, h = 8%, k = 4%
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Example 2 (Power Utility)
S3 = 25.90058
S2 = 23.762
S1 = 21 S3 = 23.31052
S0 = 20 S2 = 21.3858
S1 = 19.62 S3 = 20.97947
S3 = 19.24722
S3 = 18.88152
n = 0 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
Figure 3.4.9 A 3-period binomial tree showing the values of s where
the parameters are r = .032, h = .09, k = .019, v = 200.0, and s = 20.0
ν0 = 25%
δ2 = 146.4281
δ1 = 76.48093 ν1 = 25%
δ0 = 12.21095 δ2 = 8.141736
δ1 = −50.58155 ν2 = 25%
δ2 = −107.9549
ν3 = 25%
n = 0 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
Figure 3.4.10 Log Utility
ν0 = 25%
δ2 = 1198.038
δ1 = 445.6094 ν1 = 25%
δ0 = 155.1425 δ2 = 60..08356
δ1 = 5.909925 ν2 = 25%
δ2 = −22.47464
ν3 = 25%
n = 0 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
Figure 3.4.11 Power Utility
Two different 3-period binomial trees showing the values of δ for equal anticipations
of ν using different utility where the constants are the same as Figure 3.4.5. In the
power utility model the value of γ = .5
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Figures 3.4.10 and 3.4.11 are included to show the differences between the log
and power utility functions. Notice that for γ = 0.5 (as depicted) the log utility is
relatively more risk averse compared to the power utility function. That explains the
smaller values of the δ’s (in absolute value) for the log utility function.
From Corollary 3.3.4 we have that the additional value for power utility is
F (v, ν) =
vγ(1 + r)Nγ
γ
E˜[( dP˜
dPν
) 1
γ−1
]γ−1
· Eν
( dP˜
dPν
) γ
γ−1
− vγ(1 + r)Nγ
γ
,
and the proportion is
pi(v, ν) = 1− 1
Eν
[(
dP˜
dPν
) γ
γ−1
]
·
E˜[( dP˜
dPν
) 1
γ−1
]1−γ
.
From these expressions it is clear that if ν remains constant the proportion of
utility obtained from weak information pi(v, ν) is independent of v and the extra
utility gained from weak information F (v, ν) is an increasing function of the initial
wealth v.
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Figure 3.4.12 Value of Weak Info. given r = 3%, h = 8%, k = 4%
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Figure 3.4.13 Additional Value of Weak Info. given r = 3%, h = 8%,
k = 4%
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
Initial Wealth
pi
(v)
Precise
Uniform Dist.
Conservative
Risk−Neutral
Figure 3.4.14 Proportion of Value Added r = 3%, h = 8%, k = 4%
Example 3 (Exponential Utility)
We can also find the financial value of weak information for exponential utility.
Eν
[
−e−aVˆN
]
= e
−vα(1+r)N−
N∑
i=0
(Ni )p˜N−iq˜i ln
(
(Ni )
p˜n−iq˜i
νi
)
.
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We begin by solving for λ.
E˜
 1
(1 + r)N
· I
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
) = v
We use this equation and then plug in for I.
E˜
 1
(1 + r)N
· −1
α
· ln
(
λ
α(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
) = v
We then solve for λ to be:
λ = α(1 + r)Ne
−vα(1+r)N−Eν [ dP˜
dPν ln
(
dP˜
dPν
)
]
.
Finally we can use our I and our λ to plug in to our equation for the financial value of
weak information to solve for the value as it specifically relates to exponential utility.
u(v, ν) = Eν
U
I ( λ
(1 + r)N
· dP˜
dPν
)

= Eν
[
−e−a
−1
α
ln
(
λ
α(1+r)N
dP˜
dPν
)]
= e
−vα(1+r)N−
N∑
i=0
(Ni )p˜N−iq˜i ln
(
(Ni )
p˜n−iq˜i
νi
)
.
3.5 Appendix
Recall from section 3.3 Ψv denotes the set of self-financing portfolios given initial
wealth v.
51
Theorem 3.5.1. The discounted wealth process is a martingale under the martingale
measure Q.
Proof. See [20]. 
Theorem 3.5.2. Maximizing E[U(VN)] over the set of self-financing portfolios Ψv is
equivalent to maximizing E[U(VN)] subject to E˜[U(VN)] = v, with P˜ being the unique
equivalent martingale measure.
Proof. See [19, Lemma 4.9]. 
Theorem 3.5.3.
VˆN = I
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)
More specifically, optimal terminal wealth VˆN is attained when λ satisfies
v = E˜
 1
(1 + r)N
I
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
) .
Proof. See [20] p16. 
Chapter 4
Review of results on optimal
investment in incomplete markets
with a random endowment
In this chapter we review the results obtained in [11] and [18].
4.1 The optimization problem with random en-
dowment
Consider a utility function U : (0,∞)→ R. Assume U is strictly concave, strictly
increasing and continuously differentiable and satisfies the so-called Inada conditions:
U ′(0) := lim
x→0
U ′(x) =∞, U ′(∞) := lim
x→∞
U ′(x) = 0. (4.1.1)
Following the notation of [11] we define a self-financing portfolio as a pair (x,H),
where x ∈ R is the initial wealth and H represents a predictable S-integrable process
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that gives the number of shares of each stock held in the portfolio. Consequently,
the value process of the portfolio (denoted by X) is the stochastic integral of H with
respect to S:
Xt = x+ (H · S)t = x+
∫ t
0
HudSu, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.1.2)
Given a non-negative initial wealth x ≥ 0, let X (x) be the set of non-negative value
processes whose initial value is equal to x
X (x) = {X ≥ 0 : X satisfies 4.1.2 and X0 = x}.
In this chapter, in addition to stock price movements the terminal wealth of our
investor also depends on random endowments. Assume that at time 0 in addition
to her or his initial capital x the investor has quantities q = (qi)1≤i≤N of nontraded
European contingent claims with maturity T and FT -measurable payment functions
f = (fi)1≤i≤N in her or his portfolio. The payoff of this portfolio of contingent claims
is denoted by
〈q, f〉 =
N∑
i=1
qifi.
Following [11] we define a set of acceptable processes with initial capital x and quan-
tities q of the nontraded European contingent claims such that the terminal value of
the processes dominates the random payoff from the random endowments −〈q, f〉:
X (x, q) = {X : X is acceptable, X0 = x and XT + 〈q, f〉 ≥ 0}
See [11] for more details on acceptable processes.The reader should notice the set
X (x, q) could be empty for certain values of (x, q). This problem is addressed by
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restricting our attention to the interior of the set of points (x, q) for which X (x, q) is
not empty:
K = int{(x, q) ∈ RN+1 : X (x, q) 6= ∅}.
More generally consider the closure of the set K as in [18] which is characterized by
(see lemma 6 in [11])
clK = {(x, q) ∈ RN+1 : X (x, q) 6= ∅}.
In this context, given x and q, the goal of the investor is to maximize the expected
utility of his or her terminal wealth. This leads to the following optimization problem:
u(x, q) := sup
X∈X (x,q)
E
[
U(XT + 〈q, f〉)
]
for (x, q) ∈ clK where we assume
(x, 0) ∈ K, x > 0. (4.1.3)
This means that the situation without random endowment ( see [16] ) is a special
case of optimization with random endowment that we are describing here.
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4.2 Convex duality
To obtain results on the solution of the optimization problem described above we
make use of convex duality results. In order to formulate the dual problem we need
the following definitions and notations.
Define V (y) := supx>0
[
U(x) − yx
]
. Let us define the set L which is the relative
interior of the polar cone of −K:
L = ri{(y, r) ∈ RN : xy + qr ≥ 0 for all (x, q) ∈ K}.
and
YQ(y) = {Y ≥ 0 : Y0 = y,XY is a supermartingale under Q for all X ∈ X (1)}.
Given an arbitrary vector (y, r) ∈ L, we denote by YQ(y, r) the set of non-negative
supermartingales Y ∈ YQ(y) such that the inequality
EQ[YT (XT + qf)] ≤ xy + qr
holds true for all (x, q) ∈ K and X ∈ X (x, q). Define
vQ(y, r) := inf
Y ∈YQ(y,r)
EQ[V (YT )], (4.2.1)
for (y, r) ∈ L.
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4.3 Results
The following theorem is proved in [11]:
Theorem 4.3.1. Assume conditions M 6= ∅, (4.1.1) and (4.1.3) hold and
u(x, q) <∞
for some (x, q) ∈ K. Then we have:
(i) The function u is finitely valued on K and for any (y, r) ∈ L there exists a
constant c = c(y, r) > 0 such that v(cy, cr) is finite. The value functions u and v are
conjugate:
u(x, q) = inf
(y,r)∈L
{v(y, r) + xy + qr}, (x, q) ∈ K.
v(y, r) = sup
(x,q)∈K
{u(x, q)− xy − qr}, (y, r) ∈ L.
(ii) The solution Yˆ (y, r) to (4.2.1) exists and is unique for all (y, r) ∈ L such that
v(y, r) <∞.
4.4 The value of weak information in the presence
of a random endowment
Let Q ∈ Eν be given. Define uQ(x, q) := supX∈X (x,q) EQ[U(XT + qf)] Then the value
of weak information is defined as follows:
Definition.(Value of Weak Anticipation)
u(x, q, ν) := inf
Q∈Eν
uQ(x, q) for (x, q) ∈ K.
Chapter 5
Discrete market model with
random endowment and
anticipation
5.1 N-period general discrete market model
5.1.1 Set-up
As in chapter 3 in this chapter we are interested in optimizing utility from terminal
wealth. In this chapter however the terminal wealth is no longer solely determined
by the value of the investment portfolio but also by the value of a so-called random
endowment. Consequently the set-up of this chapter is the same as in chapter 3 with
some additional assumptions concerning the random endowment.
Assume that at time 0 the investor has an initial capital of x and q units of a non-
traded European contingent claim with maturity T . This claim has a FT -measurable
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payment function f such that the investor’s payoff at time T will be given by qf .
5.1.2 Results
In a complete market with stocks taking a finite number of possible values and the
random endowment f as described above we have the following theorem with regard
to the financial value of weak information:
Theorem 5.1.1. The financial value of weak information in a complete market is
u(v, q, ν) = min
Q∈Eν
max
δ0,δ1,...,δN−1:VN+qf≥0
EQ[U(VN+qf)] = EP
ν
U
I ( λ(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)
 ,
where λ(v, q) is determined by
E˜
 1
(1 + r)N
I
(
λ(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
) = v + qEP˜[f ]
(1 + r)N
,
where P˜ ∈ M is the unique probability measure under which the prices are martin-
gales.
Proof. Fix Q ∈ Eν . Proceed by rewriting maxδ0,δ1,...,δN−1:VN+qf≥0 EQ[U(VN +qf)]. The
Lagrangian is given by
LRE(λ) = EQ[U(VN + qf)] + λ
[
v − EQ[ dP˜
dQ
VN
(1 + r)N
]
]
The martingale method gives
VˆN + qf = I
( λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)
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so that
LRE(λ) = EQ
[
U(I
( λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)
)
]
+λ
[
v − EQ
[ dP˜
dQ
1
(1 + r)N
[
I
( λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)− qf]]]
= EQ
[
U(I
( λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)
)
]
+ λ
[
v − EQ
[ dP˜
dQ
1
(1 + r)N
I
( λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)]
+
qEP˜[f ]
(1 +R)N
]
so that
LRE(λ) = L(λ) + λ qE
P˜[f ]
(1 +R)N
where L(λ) is the Lagrangian in the case where there is no random endowment.
(see [1]) Consequently
u(v, q, ν) = min
Q∈Eν
min
λ>0
[
λ
(
v +
qEP˜[f ]
(1 +R)N
)
+ E˜
[
dQ
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)]]
Applying proposition (3.3.1) we have
u(v, q, ν) = min
λ>0
[
λ
(
v +
qEP˜[f ]
(1 +R)N
)
+ E˜
[
dPν
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)]]
take the derivative with respect to λ and setting this equal to zero we obtain
v +
qEP˜[f ]
(1 +R)N
= E˜
[
1
(1 + r)N
I
(
λ∗(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)]
where λ∗(v, q) is the minimizer. Now,
u(v, q, ν) = λ∗(v, q)
(
v +
qEP˜[f ]
(1 +R)N
)
+ E˜
[
dPν
dP˜
U
(
I
( λ∗(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
))]
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−λ∗(v, q)E˜
[
1
(1 + r)N
I
(
λ∗(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)]
= EPν
U
I ( λ∗(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)
 .

Example (Log Utility) Let U(x) = ln(x) for x > 0. Then I(x) := (U ′)−1(x) = 1
x
.
Solving
v +
qEP˜[f ]
(1 + r)N
=
1
(1 + r)N
E˜
[
(1 + r)N
λ(v, q)
dPν
dP˜
]
for λ gives
λ(v, q) =
(1 + r)N
v(1 + r)N + qEP˜[f ]
.
Then the optimal expected utility is
u(v, q, ν) = ln
[
v(1 + r)N + qEP˜[f ]
]
+ EPν
[
ln
(
Pν
P˜
)]
.
The second term can be interpreted as the relative entropy of the measures Pν and
P˜.
Example (Power Utility) Let U(x) = x
γ
γ
for x > 0 and −∞ < γ < 0 or 0 < γ < 1.
Then I(x) = x
1
γ−1 . Solving
E˜
[ 1
(1 +R)N
( λ
(1 +R)N
dP˜
dPν
) 1
γ−1
]
= v +
qEP˜[f ]
(1 +R)N
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for λ := λ(v, q) we get
λ(v, q) =
[
v(1 +R)N + qE˜[f ]
]γ−1
E˜
[(
dP˜
dPν
) 1
γ−1
]γ−1 (1 +R)N .
Consequently
u(v, q, ν) =
1
γ
(
v(1 +R)N + qE˜[f ]
E˜
[(
dP˜
dPν
) 1
γ−1
]
)γ
EPν
[( dP˜
dPν
) γ
γ−1
]
.
The theorem in [1] can be generalized to the situation of incomplete markets. In
that case the equivalent martingale measure P˜ ∈M that turns the price process into
a martingale is no longer unique.
Theorem 5.1.2. The financial value of weak information in a incomplete market is
u(v, q, ν) = inf
Q∈Eν
max
δ0,δ1,...,δN−1:VN≥0
EQ[U(VN)]
= inf
P˜∈M
[
EP˜ν
U
I ( λ(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)
]
where λ(v, q) is determined by
inf
P˜∈M
EP˜
 1
(1 + r)N
I
(
λ(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
) = v,
where M is the set of probability measures P˜ under which prices are martingales.
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Proof.
u(v, q, ν) = inf
Q∈Eν
min
λ>0
[
λv + inf
P˜∈M
EP˜
[
dQ
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)]]
= min
λ>0
[
λv + inf
Q∈Eν
inf
P˜∈M
EP˜
[
dQ
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)]]
= min
λ>0
[
λv + inf
P˜∈M
inf
Q∈Eν
EP˜
[
dQ
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)]]
= min
λ>0
[
λv + inf
P˜∈M
EP˜
[
dPν
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)]]
Taking the derivative wrt λ yields the equation
v = inf
P˜∈M
EP˜
[
1
(1 + r)N
I
(
λ(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)]
(5.1.1)
Now,
u(v, q, ν) = λ(v, q)v + inf
P˜∈M
[
E˜
dPν
dP˜
U
I ( λ(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)

−λ(v, q)E˜
 1
(1 + r)N
I
(
λ(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)]
= inf
P˜∈M
[
EP˜ν
U
I ( λ(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)
]

Example. (Power Utility) Assume U(x) = x
γ
γ
. Then I(x) = x
1
γ−1 . It follows
λ =
vγ−1(1 +R)N [(1 +R)N ]γ−1[
inf P˜
(
E˜
[(
dP˜
P˜ν
) 1
γ−1
])]γ−1
63
and
u(v, ν) =
1
γ
[v(1 +R)N ]γ(
inf P˜
(
E˜
[(
dP˜
P˜ν
) 1
γ−1
]))γ infP˜ EP˜ν
[(dP˜
P˜ν
) γ
γ−1
]
.
Suppose we are in an incomplete market now with a random endowment. Then
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1.3. The financial value of weak information in a incomplete market is
u(v, q, ν) = inf
Q∈Eν
max
δ0,δ1,...,δN−1:VN+qf≥0
EQ[U(VN+qf)] = inf
P˜∈M
[
EP˜ν
U
I ( λ(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)
],
(5.1.2)
where λ(v, q) is determined by
−
(
inf
P˜∈M
[
− E˜
 1
(1 + r)N
I
(
λ(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)+ E˜[qf ]
(1 + r)N
])
= v, (5.1.3)
where M is the set of probability measures under which the prices are martingales.
Proof. Let Q ∈ Eν . Proceed by rewriting maxδ0,δ1,...,δN−1:VN+qf≥0 EQ[U(VN + qf)].
Proceeding in a similar fashion as in the proof of theorem 5.1.1 we obtain
u(v, q, ν) = inf
Q∈Eν
min
λ>0
[
λv + min
P˜∈M
[
E˜
[
dQ
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)
+
λqf
(1 + r)N
]]]
= min
λ>0
[
λv + min
P˜∈M
[
inf
Q∈Eν
E˜
[
dQ
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dQ
)]
+ E˜
[
λqf
(1 + r)N
]]]
= min
λ>0
[
λv + min
P˜∈M
[
E˜
[
dPν
dP˜
U˜
(
λ
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)]
+ E˜
[
λqf
(1 + r)N
]]]
Taking the derivative with respect to λ and setting equal to zero we obtain the
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equation
−
(
inf
P˜∈M
[
− E˜
 1
(1 + r)N
I
(
λ(v, q)
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)+ E˜[qf ]
(1 + r)N
])
= v
for λ. Denote the solution of this equation by λ∗. Then
u(v, q, ν) = λ∗v
+ inf
P˜∈M
[
E˜
[dPν
dP˜
U
(
I
(
λ∗
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
))]
+E˜
[
λ∗qf
(1 + r)N
]
− λ
∗
(1 + r)N
E˜
[
I
(
λ∗
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
)]]
= inf
P˜∈M
[
EP˜ν
[
U
(
I
(
λ∗
(1 + r)N
dP˜
dPν
))]]

Example. (Log Utility) Assume U(x) = ln(x). Then I(z) = 1
z
and from equation
(5.1.3) we find
λ(v, q) =
1
v +
minP˜∈M E˜[qf ]
(1+r)N
Plugging this into equation (5.1.2) we obtain
u(v, q, ν) = ln
[
v(1 + r)N + min
P˜∈M
E˜[qf ]
]
+ inf
P˜∈M
EP˜ν
[
ln
(
dPν
dP˜
)]
where the second term can be interpreted as the infinimum over the relative entropies
of the probability measures P˜ν and P˜. The notation P˜ν indicates that this measure
also depends on P˜.
Example. (Power Utility) Assume U(x) = x
γ
γ
. Then I(x) = x
1
γ−1 and we observe
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that equation (5.1.3) is equivalent to
−
(
inf
P˜∈M
[
−λ 1γ−1
(1 +R)N [(1 +R)N ]
1
γ−1
E˜
( dP˜
dPν
) 1
γ−1
+ E˜[qf ]
(1 + r)N
])
= v. (5.1.4)
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